The Battle of Jessami & the Battle of Kharasom were crucial in delaying the Japanese advance to Kohima. Although massively outnumbered, inexperienced troops of 1st Assam Regiment surprised the invaders with their determined resistance. These heroic stands bought time to reinforce Kohima before the Japanese arrived.
Japanese 31 Division was divided into columns as it advanced into India. The left column, containing 58 Regiment, unexpectedly encountered 50 Indian Parachute Brigade & was delayed at the Battle of Sangshak. The Central Column, containing 138 Regiment, advanced more directly towards Kohima.
In the path of the Central Column lay 400 men of 1st Battalion Assam Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel ‘Bruno’ Brown. This was the youngest regiment in the Indian Army, raised just 3 years previously from local hill-men, including many Nagas.
They had been ordered to defend the approaches to Kohima to the last man & the last bullet. Most were dug in at the Naga village of Jessami, but A Company, 120 men strong, was 14 miles south at the village of Kharasom. At both sites, the Assam’s had carefully prepared their defensive positions, with deep trenches protected by barbed wire.
Colonel Hugh Richards, Kohima Garrison Commander, visited Jessami on March 26 & recorded in the Garrison War Diary that the ‘troops were in very good heart, expecting enemy to attack following morning’.
The Battle of Kharasom
At daybreak on March 27, Captain ‘Jock’ Young, commander of A Company, saw a battalion of Japanese approaching Kharasom complacently, with mules carrying ammunition & elephants dragging artillery. Before the Japanese could deploy, their front ranks were scythed down by fire from the Assams. At 06.00, Lt Colonel Brown’s adjutant at Jessami received a phone call from Young reporting their situation. It was the last time they heard from him, as the line was cut soon afterwards.
Three Japanese assaults before nightfall were repulsed with heavy losses. Although the defenders sustained some casualties, their defences were not penetrated. This pattern was repeated for the next three days, with mounting losses to both sides.
Frustrated by their failure to destroy the defenders, the Japanese torched Kharasom village close by, as a way to vent their spleen.
By March 30, food, water & ammunition were running low. The arrival of fresh Japanese troops convinced Young that the position would soon be overrun. So he ordered his troops to withdraw after nightfall, whilst he remained with the severely wounded. In so doing, he would comply with the order to fight to the last man. This instruction had in fact been rescinded, but the news had not reached the isolated outposts at Kharasom & Jessami.
A convoy of 23 jeeps had been sent to Kharasom to transport the Assams back to Kohima, but it was ambushed en route. The vehicles were captured intact & put to use by the Japanese.
After beating off another night assault, all Young’s troops who were capable of leaving slipped away quietly.
Young remained at Kharasom & was last seen on the fire step of his bunker, beside a wounded sepoy. They were piling magazines & grenades on the parapet.
Gunfire was heard at dawn. Neither Young nor his wounded men were seen again alive.
Of the 120 Assam troops who had fought at Kharasom, 56 made it back to Kohima two days later. Colonel Hugh Richards, Garrison Commander at Kohima, wrote of Jock Young’s heroic stand that
“As an example of complete self-sacrifice, nothing could be more magnificent.” (8)
A webinar by Robert Lyman & Roy McCallum about Jock Young and the 1st Assams at Kharasom can be found here.
The Battle of Jessami
March 27. Feverish preparation
Lieutenant Colonel ‘Bruno’ Brown & 280 men of 1st Assam Regiment at Jessami lay in the path of the main thrust of the Japanese 138 Infantry Regiment. As at Kharasom, the Assams at Jessami had prepared their position carefully, with deep trenches & mortar pits protected by barbed wire.
The field works were arranged so that an outer ring of bunkers & foxholes, with cleared fields of fire, protected an inner line comprising the command post, hospital, mortar positions & supply dumps. All was surrounded by barbed wire.
They spent March 27 stood-to, awaiting the arrival of the Japanese. Brown’s adjutant Captain Michael Williamson recalled:
“We spent all that day at Jessami in feverish preparation, the final distribution of hard rations & ammunition, getting in more water, reinforcing the perimeter & booby-traps, making improvements to the positions & checking on the internal telephone system. We had a cooked hot meal, which was to be the last for many days &, in some cases, weeks.” (10)
March 28. The Japanese reach Jessami
At 08.55 on March 28, the leading Japanese came into sight, along the road from Kharasom. The Assams watched the first 25 approach to within 40 yards, before stopping to consult a map. They seemed taller than had been expected. A burst of fire from Bren light machine guns killed all but two, who crawled away wounded.
Once alerted to the presence of their opponents, the main Japanese force behaved cautiously, spending the day attempting to draw fire from the Assams, to determine their strength & locations. The Assams were now surrounded, but they waited calmly without returning fire.
Several noisy Banzai charges were made in the night, but were beaten off by the defenders’ fire without loss to the Assams. Isolated infiltrators got through the wire before being killed. Documents & a unit flag were gathered from Japanese corpses for intelligence purposes & carried to Kohima by runner. This was a good start, but the Assams knew that far worse was to come.
March 29. Last round
A staff meeting at Kohima decided to rescind the order that 1st Assams should fight to the ‘last man, last round’. Withdrawals from Jessami & Kharasom should instead occur after dark on March 31. However, phone lines to these villages had been cut & access of couriers was blocked by the Japanese. Next day, a light plane was sent to drop the order to the Jessami garrison, but this missed its target & was recovered by the Japanese.
Meanwhile, the Assams were in good spirits, having survived another night without any fatalities. Many Japanese corpses lay in front of them, some hanging from the barbed wire.
Captain Williamson, Adjutant, described the day’s activities:
“Apart from another heavy attack in the morning, we had a comparatively quiet day. We took full advantage of this to brew hot tea. We assumed that the Jap was licking his wounds & bringing up reinforcements, for towards evening he opened up with his beastly little battalion gun (nicknamed the ‘Whizz-bang’), but it did little damage on this occasion.” (10)
Japanese & their allies in the Indian National Army (INA) called out in English & in Hindustani for the defenders to surrender. Sovehu Angami, a havildar (sergeant) in the 1st Assams, recalled that
“The INA soldiers would ask our soldiers to go & join them in Hindi. Sometimes, our soldiers would invite them in Hindi & fire at them when they appeared!” (9)
Captain Peter Steyn recorded:
“During the night, the Japs would lie in some dead ground & call on the officers & men – both in English & Hindustani – to surrender & to come over & join them as Assam & India were about to fall into their hands. This had no effect on anyone, even when the Japs used our names, which they presumably had got from documents previously captured.” (10)
March 30. All the calmness in the world
By March 30, most of Japanese 31 Division had reached Jessami. Three companies of 1st Assam Regiment were now facing five battalions of Japanese infantry & two battalions of mountain artillery. These were prodigious odds.
The accumulated firepower of the Japanese artillery was able to knock out the Assam’s mortars. This loss & the persistent shelling eroded their ability to hold their assailants at bay.
During the morning, Lt General Scoones, Commander of 4 Corps, spoke by telephone to the Assam’s CO, Lt Colonel Brown. The latter reported that the Battalion could not be expected to hold out much longer. Soones’s answer was
“Keep on hitting them & we will see what help we can give you from this end.” (10)
Almost immediately, the line went dead, most likely having been cut. Since the wireless set was already broken, no further communication with the outside world was possible.
That night, wave after wave of determined Japanese assaults were thrown against the position. Some of the outer trenches were overrun, but the inner defences stood firm.
Captain Peter Steyn was proud of the resolute fortitude shown by his men:
“Young & inexperienced sepoys were fighting like veterans; red-hot machine-gun barrels would be ripped off, regardless of burns suffered in the process; Japanese grenades & cracker-bombs were picked up & thrown clear of the trenches with all the calmness in the world & there did not seem to be a man in the garrison afraid to carry out any task given to him.” (10)
Jemadar (warrant officer) Tonghen Kuki showed conspicuous courage in supporting one of the defenders’ forward bunkers, for which he later received the military cross. The citation read:
“After three days of hard fighting between 28th & 30th March 44 at JESSAMI, it was known that our men in a forward & isolated bunker position were short of food. Jemadar TONGHEN KUKI volunteered to get the food to them, although aware that the ground was covered by Japanese machine guns at very short range. Despite the fact that he was clearly visible to the enemy, he again & again crossed the open space to the bunker carrying food, water & ammunition, under constant enemy fire from which he was eventually badly wounded in the head. The magnificent courage of this Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer undoubtedly saved the lives of the men in the bunker, as well as enabling them to continue the fight. His complete disregard of personal safety & determination were in the finest traditions of the service.” (9)
“Wellington Massar, a sepoy, was always known as the bad boy of the Battalion & a perfect nuisance to his company commander. However, once we were in action he was superb; there is no doubt that he thoroughly enjoyed mowing down Japs at the end of his bren gun, which he manned throughout the siege.” (10)
March 31. The spirit of the battalion was magnificent throughout.
The Japanese maintained their pressure on the garrison at Jessami throughout March 31. Attempts were made to deliver supplies by parachute, but they missed the drop zone & were gathered by the Japanese.
Surrounded & with their radio smashed, the Assams still believed they were under orders to fight to the last man. A light aircraft flew low over the camp & dropped a message that the order was rescinded, but it missed the target & was recovered by the Japanese.
Knowing that the message dropped by plane had been intercepted, Lieutenant John Corlett volunteered to carry through the enemy’s lines an order to withdraw immediately.
At nightfall, he & his orderly crept cautiously to Jessami, guided by gunfire. Initially, the Assams shot at him, assuming he was a Japanese infiltrator, but he shouted ‘like mad’ & persuaded them otherwise. Lt Colonel Brown decided it was too late to withdraw that night, so the garrison had to hold out at Jessami through another long day.
Expecting an attempt to break out, the Japanese attacked repeatedly. In ferocious fighting, bunkers changed hands & defences were breached, only to be restored with desperate counter-charges.
When night came at last, the Assams began to withdraw, one sector at a time. The only assistance that could be given them were words of encouragement. The Command Post was finally evacuated near midnight, after destroying documents. Some positions were so hard pressed that they never found the opportunity to disengage & fought to the last.
When the Japanese realised that the Assams were leaving, they ran ‘howling & screaming’ through the vacated bunkers & surrounding jungle, searching for the men who had vanished. Confusion was rife, & several Assams were killed by friendly fire.
All tracks from Jessami were heavily guarded & group after group ran into ambushes, which took a heavy toll on the exhausted troops
Parties fragmented & progress was slow, especially for groups with walking wounded. The Medical Officer had patched men up to allow them to escape. In staying to help the last of the injured, he was captured within a mile of Jessami.
Two groups, of about eighty men each, reached Kohima on April 3, having marched 78 miles in just 39 hours. Shortly before arriving, they were mistaken for Japanese & strafed by RAF aircraft. Many stragglers arrived later, alone or in small groups.
Garrison Commander Hugh Richards wrote:
“The arrival of Col Brown & his men marching in with their heads held erect was one of the finest sights of the battle. Until his arrival, no one knew what had happened to him.” (8)
Brown’s uniform was so tattered that the Deputy Commissioner gave him a sweater, which he wore for the next two weeks.
JESSAMI became the Assam Regiments first battle honour. 33 Corps despatches recorded that:
Orders were given to the Jessami & Kharasom garrisons to withdraw on the night 31 March/1 April. A message in clear was dropped on Jessami by air but, unfortunately, not on the garrison. The consequence of this was that, when 1st Assam Regiment withdrawal took place, all roads & tracks leaving from Jessami were heavily ambushed by the enemy. The withdrawal of 1st Assam Regiment completed a brilliant operation by a comparatively new battalion in their baptism of fire. Not only had it held the enemy attacks & inflicted more casualties than it suffered, but it had successfully delayed the enemy’s advance and thus given valuable time for preparation to the Kohima Garrison. The spirit of the battalion was magnificent throughout & in the end it had extricated itself without any of the help it had been led to expect.
In total, 260 survivors of the Battles of Jessami & Kharasom made it to Kohima. The wounded were transported on to Dimapur, whilst the others joined the garrison. 1 Assam’s War Diary reported that:
“Many of these men were without boots & little clothing, some were wounded & all were tired out & not in a fit state to fight.”
Nevertheless, they went into action almost immediately, when the Japanese attacked Kohima.
Lieutenant General Sato, Commander of Japanese 31 Division heading for Kohima, was furious at the delays caused by attacking the outposts at Jessami & Kharasom, which could have been bypassed by the bulk of his force. These & the Battle of Sangshak bought crucial time to reinforce the Garrison at Kohima before the Japanese arrived on April 4. Had they reached their destination earlier, there would have been very little to stop them.
A webinar can be found here about the role of 1st Assam Regiment in 1944, by Rob Lyman & Bruno Brown’s granddaughter Charlotte Carty
