Chindits

Creation of the Chindits

The Chindits were the brainchild of Orde Wingate, perhaps the most controversial general in British history. Winston Churchill considered him “a man of genius”, but Churchill’s personal physician thought him borderline insane; of course, these two characteristics are not mutually exclusive. He was certainly unorthodox, single-minded & famous for his eccentricities.

Wingate was born in India in 1903 & educated at Charterhouse School in England. He was trained at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich & commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1923.

In 1936-39, Wingate was posted to a staff intelligence role in Palestine, where he created, trained & led ‘Special Night Squads’ of Zionists that operated against Arabs who were resisting Zionist expansion.  In 1940-41, Wingate led the ‘Gideon Force’ of guerillas against the Italians in Ethiopia.  With about 1,600 Ethiopian & Sudanese troops & up to 15,000 camels, this force attacked enemy strongpoints & harried supply lines in remote & difficult territory. The six week campaign captured over 15,000 Italian & Abyssinian troops.

These experiences led him to propose

“…to assemble & employ a force of the highest fighting qualities capable of employment in widely separated columns … allocated an objective behind the enemy’s lines, the gaining of which will decisively affect the campaign.” (32)

Wingate propsed that supply by air would be preferable to the traditional dependence on roads:

“The vulnerable artery is the Line of Communication winding through the jungle. Have no L of C on the jungle floor. Bring in the goods like Father Christmas, down the chimney.” (33)

In early 1942, with British resistance crumbling in Burma, the War Office offered the services of Lt Colonel Wingate to General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief India.  Wingate’s operations in Palestine & Ethiopia had been under Wavell’s command, so the latter well appreciated how effective they could be. 

A kindred spirit for Wingate was Major Mike Calvert, who was working at the Bush Warfare School at Maymyo, training officers & non-commissioned officers to lead bands of guerillas against the Japanese in China.  Calvert had observed the Japanese invasion of China & had trained commandos for demolition operations in Hong Kong.  He himself had used such techniques to delay the German invasion of Norway in 1940.

After intelligence gathering with Calvert, Wingate gained permission from Wavell to form the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, which was intended to function deep in enemy territory in Long Range Penetration (LRP) missions.  The brigade was organized into eight columns that would employ hit-&-run tactics.  The columns had about 400 men, including a Reconnaissance Platoon of 2nd Burma Rifles, two mortars & two Vickers machine guns. There was also a Mule Transport Platoon, with about 100 mules to carry heavy equipment & supplies. An RAF Liaison Officer attached to each column directed air resupply drops by radio. 

The brigade underwent rigorous training in the central Indian jungle near Jhansi for river crossings & jungle warfare.  

Wingate dubbed the force ‘Chindits’ from the statues of mythical chinthe winged lions that guard Burmese pagodas.   

Operation Longcloth

Operation Longcloth was initially planned to coordinate with an effort by the Chinese Nationalists that would divert Japanese forces from responding to the Chindits.  In the event, the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek failed to commit his forces, but Operation Longcloth went ahead anyway, despite the greater risk without the Chinese diversion. 

77th Brigade crossed the Chindwin River on February 13th 1943.  They headed east in two thrusts, deep into northern Burma.  Although over 1,100 mules were used to carry equipment, ammunition & supplies, each Chindit carried on average 72 to 80lb of gear. Man & mule marched in a single file, termed a ‘snake’, that could stretch for half a mile.  

They were resupplied by C47 Dakotas & Hudsons of 31 Squadron RAF, flying from Agartala in India, which delivered 300 tonnes during the operation.  Japanese supply dumps were attacked, convoys ambushed & lines of communication disrupted. They blew up the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway in more than seventy places.  

Eventually, Wingate was ordered to withdraw on March 24th, as they had reached the limit of range for air resupply, many were sick & the Japanese were closing in.  The Chindit Brigade split into columns & dispersed, eventually reaching India having marched between 750 & 1,000 miles, some via China. 

Of the 3,000 who entered Burma in February, only 2,182 returned.  Almost all who returned were hospitalised & 600 of these were too unfit to return to service. Many had ‘Chindit Syndrome’, a combination of ailments including malaria, dysentry & infected sores. The scale of the losses forced a decision that future expeditions should attempt to evacuate sick & wounded by air.

After the bitter defeat of the British in Burma in 1942, Operation Longcloth was presented as a great success.  It showed that the Japanese were not invincible & boosted morale considerably. 

More detail about Operation Longcloth can be found here.

Operation Thursday

Winston Churchill was delighted with Operation Longcloth & took Wingate with him to meet President Roosevelt at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec in August.  Roosevelt was impressed & offered additional US aircraft to support a larger operation in 1944.  This was known as the 1st Air Commando & provided transport, glider & light aircraft, as well as fighters & bombers for close support.  It even included experimental helicopters. 

Wingate was promoted to Major General & the Chindits were expanded to six brigades composed of British, Gurkha & Nigerian battalions, with supporting units, a total of 20,000 men.  They were dubbed Special Force, with a cover name of 3rd Indian Division. 

Their task, code-named Operation Thursday, was to deploy into Japanese rear areas to support an offensive into northern Burma by Chinese & US troops under General Joe Stilwell.  The strategic aim was to take Myitkyina & provide a land route from India to China for large scale delivery of supplies.   

Five of the six Chindit Brigades were committed to Operation Thursday. The sixth, 23 Brigade, was kept in reserve & deployed in the Battle of Kohima.

Only one of the five brigades involved in Operation Thursday travelled entirely by foot. This was 16 Brigade, which set off on 5 February 1944 & marched for six weeks through very rough terrain to reach its operational area near Indaw. 

The other four Chindit brigades were flown into Burma by 1st Air Commando & the RAF.

The fly-in began during the night of 5/6 March. Three landing zones had been chosen, code-named Piccadilly, Broadway & Chowringhee. 

However, a last-minute reconnaissance flight discovered logs blocking the Piccadilly landing zone. Not only did this rule out Piccadilly, but it raised fears that the Japanese were aware of the operation. An anxious conference of senior officers decided to adjust the plan & risk carrying on.

The first wave carried 1st Battalion King’s Regiment (Liverpool) of 77th Brigade to Broadway, along with British & US sappers. They travelled in Waco gliders pulled by C47 Dakota tugs.  To get troops on the ground quickly, each tug pulled two gliders.

At the same time as they headed into Burma during the night of 5/6 March, Japanese infantry were marching into India to attack Imphal.  

Thirty-seven gliders reached Broadway.  The first to land were difficult to push out of the way because ruts in the ground had ripped off their undercarriages; this caused collisions when the next gliders arrived.  As the landing strip became blocked with wreckage, Brigadier Mike Calvert signaled to cancel further arrivals.

Twenty-three men had been killed & thirty injured in the landings.  Another sixty-six men failed to arrive because several gliders were lost en route when tow-lines parted accidentally or were intentionally released due to turbulence. Some who came down in Burma were captured.     

US Engineers & British sappers cleared the area.  A light bulldozer delivered in one of the gliders was used to prepare a dirt strip where C47 Dakotas could land.  By the evening of 6 March (Calvert’s 31st birthday), the fly ins resumed, guided now by landing lights.  They continued over the next five nights, delivering the rest of 77th Brigade & two battalions of 111th Brigade. 

For establishing Broadway, immediate DSOs were awarded to Brig Calvert, CO of 77th Brigade, & Lt Col Walter ‘Scotty’ Scott, CO of 1st Battalion King’s Regt. (Liverpool).    

Brigadier ‘Joe’ Lentaigne & the rest of 111th Brigade flew into Chowringhee from 6-10 March.  They then abandoned that landing zone & marched to join the other battalions of 111th Brigade near Nankan. 

Morris Force, comprising 4/9 Gurkha Rifles & part of 3/4 Gurkha Rifles, headed northeast towards the Chinese border, where they eventually linked up with the Chinese. 

Japanese Oscar fighter aircraft arrived the morning after Chowringhee was abandoned, but all they found to strafe was a few derelict gliders.

Meanwhile, Calvert left two battalions to defend Broadway & led the other three battalions of 77th Brigade 60 miles southwest to Henu, near Mawlu, where they established a stronghold, dubbed White City, that blocked the railway & road.  

On March 17, a bayonet charge was needed to clear Japanese troops on a hill with a pagoda.  In the ensuing melee, a posthumous Victoria Cross was earned by Lt George Cairns of the 1st South Staffords. 

A landing strip was created at White City & it was turned into a powerful defensive position, with bunkers, barbed wire, mines & artillery comprising four 25 pdr howitzers, four 2 pdr anti-tank guns & four 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns.  Floater columns patrolled outside the wire, to attack in the flanks & rear any enemy units assaulting White City. 

Broadway was also turned into a fortress, strengthened for a time by a flight of RAF Spitfires using it as a Forward Operating Base.

Both Broadway & White City repulsed attacks sustained over several weeks, inflicting heavy casualties on their assailants. Well over a thousand Japanese are thought to have been killed at White City.     

After their long & grueling trek by foot, 16th Brigade established a stronghold dubbed Aberdeen on March 19-21.  Gliders then brought in light bulldozers to help construct an airstrip, enabling C47 Dakotas to fly in 14th Brigade & part of 3rd (West African) Brigade from March 23.  The rest of the West Africans were flown into Broadway.

Maj General Wingate flew into Broadway & White City to ascertain how they were faring & to boost morale.  On March 24, he was travelling back to Chindit HQ at Sylhet in an overloaded USAF B-25 when it crashed, killing all ten on board.  The Chindits were stunned by the loss of their charismatic leader.

Brigadier ‘Joe’ Lentaigne, CO of 111th Brigade, was promoted to Major General & placed in command of Special Force.  He was an experienced Gurkha officer with great personal bravery, having earned a DSO during the 1942 retreat & three times mentioned in dispatches.  But he did not have the charisma of Wingate nor the personal support of Churchill that Wingate enjoyed. 

 On May 1, command of the Chindits was transferred to the US General ‘Vinegar Joe’ Stillwell, despite his dislike of the British.

16th Brigade had been intended to disrupt the lines of communication of the Japanese 15th & 31st Divisions that were attacking Imphal & Kohima.  Stilwell redirected them to support his US/Chinese forces instead. They attacked Indaw, but without much success.  Exhausted & out of water, 16th Brigade withdrew to their Aberdeen stronghold & were eventually flown back to India.

111th Brigade, now commanded by Major John Masters, established a new stronghold called Blackpool.  It was intended to block the road & railway to Myitkyina, but was not sited close enough to do this effectively.  It quickly came under heavy attack.  The situation worsened significantly when the monsoon broke, disrupting close air support, resupply & evacuation of casualties.  The torrential rain also delayed arrival of support from other Chindit brigades.  As casualties mounted & ammunition, food & medical supplies ran low, the remnants of 111th Brigade abandoned Blackpool on May 25 to avoid being overrun.  They shot about twenty of their most seriously wounded to save them from capture.  Shielded by 3rd (West African) Brigade, they reached the relative safety of Indawgyi Lake, where some of their sick or wounded were evacuated. 

77th Brigade left White City & headed north to Mogaung, a small town on the road & railway route to Myitkyina.  Capturing it took three weeks of heavy fighting, June 6-27, with Chindit battalions down to company strength ejecting superior numbers of Japanese.  Victoria Crosses were earned in this bitter contest by Capt. Michael Allmand (posthumous) & Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun, both of 3/6 Gurkha Rifles.  A flamethrower detachment was parachuted in to overcome enemy bunkers.  By the time Mogaung was taken, barely three hundred men were left standing in 77th Brigade.  After an arduous march, they were flown back to India in early July.

For a few more weeks, 3rd (West African), 14th & 111th Brigades continued to harass the Japanese in support of Stilwell’s US/Chinese offensive on Myitkyina, which fell on August 3.  As their enemy was pushed south, the Chindit’s campaign ended.  Most had been operating for substantially longer than the three months that had been envisaged by Wingate.  Exhausted, emaciated & disease-ridden, they gradually returned to India.  They took months to recuperate & many were never again fit enough for combat.

Impact

In his memoire “Defeat into Victory”, Field Marshal Slim wrote

“The Chindits gave a splendid example of courage & hardihood.  Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped & mentally adjusted for one kind of operation were wasteful.  They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, materiel & time that they absorbed.” (24)

A less dismissive view was held by Sir Robert Thompson, Permanent Secretary of Defense for Malaya during the Emergency, one of the architects of the counter-insurgency plan.  He had served as Calvert’s RAF Liaison Officer during Operations Longcloth & Thursday, earning the Military Cross & Distinguished Service Order in this role.  He asserted that the Chindit concept was sound, but had been compromised by bad handling & use in roles for which they were not trained or equipped.  Key examples were static defense of strongholds & assault of well-prepared enemy positions, as prevailed under Stilwell’s command.

The relatively small scale of Operation Longcloth mitigated against any substantial or enduring military impact.  However, it was an important step in demonstrating the viability of sustaining large units by air.  With this experience, Slim prepared the resources to maintain a Division with its lines of communication cut. 

This scenario came in February 1944, at the Battle of Admin Box.  A situation that might otherwise have proved calamitous was turned, through aerial resupply, into 14th Army’s first decisive victory.  After this success, supply by air became the foundation for British victory in Burma.

Lt General Mutaguchi, Commander of the Japanese 15th Army in Burma, was impressed by the Chindit’s ability to function effectively so far from any supply base.  This encouraged his belief that an invasion in the opposite direction could also be successful, despite warnings that mountains & the Chindwin River would jeopardize his lines of communication.  He ignored the crucial fact that Longcloth was only viable because of the Allied capacity for air transport at a massive scale.  The Japanese air force had no chance of emulating this,  but Mutaguchi used Operation Longcloth as precedent to justify his reckless gamble. As a consequence, his army collapsed in a logistic catastrophe after invading India in 1944.

After the failure of his invasion of India, Mutaguchi claimed that Operation Thursday had drawn off vitally needed Japanese units, helping tip the balance in favour of the allies. He later wrote

“The advance into Burma of General Wingate’s forces at the time of the Imphal campaign brought about serious failures in the strategy of the Japanese army. Wingate’s airborne tactics put a great obstacle in the way of our Imphal plan & were an important reason for its failure.”

In assessing these claims, one should consider if Mutaguchi was seeking excuses to ameliorate the blame for his own cavalier neglect of logistical imperatives.  

As well as misleading Mutaguchi, Operation Longcloth allowed Churchill to persuade President Roosevelt that the British could make an important contribution towards keeping the Chinese Nationalists in the war, thereby committing a million Japanese troops away from the US forces approaching Japan.  Recognition of this strategic potential led the US to send more resources to India & Burma.  

Operation Thursday had a major impact on Japanese air power in Burma.  This had already been weakened by the contest for air domination above the Admin Box in February.  In preparation for the invasion of India, the Japanese moved three Air Force squadrons forward to Shwebo & Onbauk airfields, which were better placed to attack Imphal.  As Operation Thursday was completely dependent on air superiority, the USAAF 1st Air Commando Group attacked the enemy forward airfields in the days leading up to the glider landings. At least eighty enemy aircraft were destroyed, diverted or delayed from their planned roles supporting the Imphal offensive. What survived flew more than half their missions against the Chindits between March 10 & April 15, instead of attacking Imphal & Kohima.  

The Allied victory at Imphal would not have been possible without the air superiority that enabled delivery of unprecedented volumes of supplies & reinforcements.  This aerial domination might not have been achieved had it not been for the Chindit operations bringing 1st Air Commando Group to the skies above northern Burma.